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Preface
During

my

early studies of Roman history I became

intrigued with the question of whether the ancients attempted
to control their economy or whether they merely reacted to
the changes as they occurred.

To me, ancient sources seem

to focus primarily on political and military aspects of
history.
In this work I will attempt to discover whether Julius
Caesar showed a systematic plan of action in dealing with
the economy of the Spanish provinces.

E. Badian (Roman

Imperialism in the Late Republic, pp. 18-26) has well shown
that the Republican government did not exhibit a systematic
economic policy in dealing with its provinces.

However,

Caesar was a man who seemed to have a better grasp of the
economic implications of his actions, but did he exhibit a
particular plan of action in this·realm?
I would like to thank the Department of Ancient Languages
for its help and encouragement in this endeavor, in particular,
my advisor, Dr. J.s. White whose advice has been invaluable
and

Dr.

S.F. Johanson, who many tim�s has patiently endured

my arguments.

I am also indebted to Dr. T.R. Selby for his

support and conoern and to the Graduate School which has made
this year possible with its generous fellowship.

Lastly, I

would like to thank my wife for typing this paper and supporting
me in the darkest hour of this endeavor.
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Chapter I
CAESAR IN SPAIN: AN ECONOMIC- POLICY?

Roman interest in Spain dates back to at least
before the Second Punic War.

In 226 B.C. the Ebro treaty

recognized Spain as the domain of Carthage; the rights of
Saguntum which was allied to Rome had been guaranteed
earlier.

Following the settlement of the war Spain became
2
Homan territory. For the next seventy years Spain was in
fairly constant turmoil and revolt.

While Homan rule has

generally been characterized as "exploitation, not unmixed
with extortion,"

3

and territorial expansion at the expense

of the natives, there were high spots under the administration
of more sensible men such as Cato and Gracchus.

From 154

to 133 B.C. Spain was torn apart by two long wars for
liberation;

the Lusitanian War produced the hero of Spanish

independence, Viriathus, and the Celtiberian War brought
about a general acceptance of Roman authority.
Although there were some incidences following the
destruction of Numantia, the provinces of Spain were
relatively peaceful, for this period saw political turmoil
in Rome and troubles in the East.

5

Spain was not a center

of interest again until the outbreak of the Sertorian War.
Following the settlement of Pompeius, Spain remained
relatively calm, until Caesar's expeditions in 61 and the
outbreak of the Civil War in 49.

Let us now take a look at

2

the situation in Spain during the period following the
Senatorial Commission of 133 B.C.
Since 197 B.C. Spain had been divided into two
provinces, Ulterior and Citerior (Livy, 32.28.11).

The

chie� administrative official in each province was an
6
ex-praetor or ex-consul with imnerium proconsule. The staff
of each governor consisted of one quaestor and three legati
(one for an ex-praetor) and, of course, some lower echelon
clerical workers.

The term of duty was usually one year,

though extensions were not unusual in times of trouble.
The duties of the provincial administration, either
under or with the approval of the Senate and limited by the
7
lex provinciae, are summarized by Van Nostrand:
1. Collection of tribute, taxes, etc.
2. Regulation of industry, commerce and trade
3. Definition and protection of boundaries
4. Introduction and supervision of Roman Law
5. Determination of political status of communities
6. Recommendation of individuals or groups for
citizenship
The duties of the quaestors were generally financial since
8
they were responsible for the stipendium.
Spain was not the coveted opportunity that the Eastern
9
provinces were. There was less chance for personal profit
and the absence. of publicani provided less chance for rewards,
financial or political.
It is not in the scope of this paper to delve into the
complexities of Roman foreign policy, so let it suffice to
say that in return for the organization and administration

3
Rome expected compensation, which she received in three
10
forms: money, men and the fruits of mines and fields.
The
major part of this was the tributum, which was a stipendium
certum, part of which was paid as vicensumas (grain tax) at
11
the rate of one twentieth or half a tithe.
The stipendium
was paid generally in coin but sometimes in kind directly
to the quaestor by the natives so no tax contracts were
involved.
For the early period of Roman rule Livy provides an
idea of the amounts of gold and silver which were extracted
from Spain, though there is some dispute as to the exact
12
nature of the Oscenses argenti.
These metals probably were
not a part of the stipendium but rather fell to Rome as the
produce of state owned mines.

The yield decreased from its

early magnitude and in the time of Polybius was about 25,000
denarii annually (34.9) from the mines near Carthage Nova.
The term vectigalia was used to designate a variety of
other taxes.

13

Sources for these taxes are scanty, and much

is assumed from the policies in other provinces.

The portoria,

customs duties, were two per cent and applied only to goods
entering or leaving the province, thus intra-province trade
14
was duty-free.
Various other taxes covering inheritance,
manumission and· sales were imposed, and probably additional
monies were collected from the leasing of whatever ager
publicus the provinces contained, forests and a probable salt
monopoly.

15

Plutarch (Pomp. 45) provides a definite account of

4
public finance for 6J B.C., before the inclusion of Pompeius 1
new provinces.

The annual income of Rome was 50,000,000

denarii a year, and Spain's proposed portion about six million,
later five to eight million, not including portoria and
"other less important sources like the monopolies on public
forests, and the fishing, river and salt taxes."

16

Thus

Spain, as a whole, stands as the second most important source
of revenue to the Republic prior to the settlement of
Pompeius' new provinces.
The primary administrative expense of the provinces
of Spain was the army, usually one or two full legions in
each province, from the fall of Numantia to the Civil Wars
of Caesar.

17

Caesar found two legions in Ulterior when he

arrived as proconsul (Plut. Caes. 12). Surely during the
Sertorian War the number had been greater.

In 55 B.C.

P9mpeius was given both provinces of Spain with four legions
which he probably increased to six regular legions and one
in Italy; the budget was one thousand talents (six million
18
denarii).
T. Frank estimates a legion at about 800,000
to 1,000,000 denarii a year, from which we can see that the
major expense was the armies.

If administrative costs and

expenses for public works, roads, harbors, etc. are included,
it is probable.that the budget generally broke even and at
times, such as when additional troops were needed, was "in
the red.

11

In dealing with the flow of wealth in or out of Spain,
its balance of payments, other aspects are scantly recorded.

5
Money taken out by each administration varied greatly
depending on the greed and ethics of the governor.

Caesar

enriched himself handsomely when he was proconsul, probably
taking out enough to cover his supposed twenty-five million
dena�ii debt (App. B,C. 2.26), but this was an unusual case
and affected parts of the peninsula which were not under
Roman control until that time.

The sums extracted by other

governors were not nearly as large during peaceful times,
and that Spain was not considered as lucrative an assignment
as the Eastern provinces has already been pointed out.

The

removal of money from the provinces as profits of tax
farmers was small because·the main bulk of the taxes, the
stipendium, was not farmed out, and natives probably
received the contracts for portoria and other minor taxes.

19

Commercial investments in the provinces were high.
"It is likely that renewed placements of investments abroad
20
used more Italian credit than the profits brought."
During
Cicero's consulship an embargo on gold and silver leaving
21
Italy was imposed.
Though this primarily was going to the
Eastern provinces, it does show that there was some concern
for Rome's balance of payments and it is not unreasonable
to assume that some of these investments were headed for Spain.
It seems to me -that the balance of payments during this
period was generally in favor of Spain.

Yet Spain provided

a source of funds for individuals such as Caesar and
Pompeius and was known as a land of wealth.

Let us now

examine that wealth and its relation to the economic

6
situation before Caesar's quaestorship.
Spain was well known in ancient times as a source of
Pliny (N,H. 3.30) states "metallis plumbi,

mineral wealth.

ferri, aeris, argenti, auri tota ferme Hispania. 11 Even
Catuilus comments on its wealth in one of his poems (29.19),
probably referring to the activities of Caesar as proconsul.
Roman mining in Spain was extensive, but evidence dealing
with Republican times is not as extensive as that for the
Imperial period.

22

Archaeological evidence is also meager

in that few sites have been extensively examined, and certain
problems present in the mines have tended to obscure workings
of the Republican period. Many mines were continuously or
intermittently worked which destroyed some evidence of earlier
Rio Tinto mines were worked by Carthaginians; the
23
Romans then worked them for gold and silver (Strabo 3.2.8).
workings.

Important finds of first century B.C. coins have been found
in the mining town there, showing it was well worked in the
late Republic.

The mines reached their peak in the first and

second centuries of our era, were reopened by Visigoths in
the fourth and are even being worked today for copper.

Ancient

slag heaps were sometimes re-smelted for whatever ore was left
when the mines were worked out, thus destroying evidence of
earlier workings.

Many less elaborately worked mines provide

difficult dating due to the similarity in techniques and
equipment of the period extending from early times to the
Middle Ages.
The Romans did work the mineral deposits in Spain

7
Ownership of the

extensively during the Republican times.
mines is in dispute.

24

Probably the Romans overtook

ownership of silver and gold mines which the Carthaginians
had worked.

Livy's accounts of silver and gold reserves

taken- to Rome were probably from state owned mines.
(J.2.1O)

25

Strabo

definitely stated that during his time the mines

were privately owned and T. Frank supposes they were sold
26
during the Sullan_period.
Crassus owned mines in Spain
during Caesar's time (Plut. Crass. 2), and mining companies
(societas) are noted in the Republican lead mines.

Later,

Tiberius is credited with having begun the state takeover of
privately owned mines (Tac. Ann. 6.19.1).

On the running of

the state owned mines leased to individual miners and the
organization of the administration of the mines and mining
communities, the· Lex Metalli Vipascensis provides valuable
information dealing with Imperial times.

27

Some similar,

though not as extensive regulations, were probably in effect
for state owned mines during Republican times to insure
work was maintained and controlled.
Roman mining differed economically from modern in
28
Quick profits were important due to a
certain aspects.
lack of extensive credit, thus ore with a somewhat lower
percentage was not smelted, though in a long-term operation
it would have been profitable.

While the market for metals

was less sensitive on a short term due to the slowness of
communication, new finds would drastically change the gold
silver-bronze ratio.

Labor was basically manual though large

8

mines in Imperial times did show some surprising technical
and engineering advances such as the Archimides screw
(cochlea) and water wheels for drainage, hoists for hauling
Labor

and even the diverting of rivers for hydraulic mining.
was e1ther low paid freemen or slave.

Polybius (Strabo,

3.2.10) recorded the workings around Carthago Nova which
employed 40,000 workmen and yielded 25,000 drachmae, a
If the 25,000 indicated net profit,
29
however, the percentage would have been much higher.

profit of seven per cent.

Gold was commonly found present with silver (Pliny,
N,H. 33.80) and was mined in Spain during the Republican
times, but the major gold fields of the Northwest were not
opened to Romans until after Augustus' Spanish Wars.

Silver

remained the most sought precious metal in Spain during the
Republic.

Caesar himself in his triumph symbol_ized the

province as the land of silver (Vell. Pater., 2.56.2).
Hannibal took three hundred pounds of silver a day from
Spanish mines, probably those around Carthage Nova (Pliny,
N,H. 33.97); while the Roman yield after occupation was
somewhat less, Livy still reports amounts which annually
account for about five per cent of the estimated state income
30
The mines around Carthage Nova were
from 218 to 168 B.C.
31
a fact which West assumes led to the
slowly played out,
32
decline of that city as an administrative center.
Augustus
moved the capital of the Eastern province to Tarraco.

Other

silver mines in Citerior remained important though, with
centers around Osca and modern Murcia.

Around Castulo two

9
mining companies, metallum Samariense and Antonianum, were
considered important in Republican times.

33

The Sierra

Morena range proved to be very profitable and was extensively
worked in Imperial times.

Strabo mentions the importance

of Turdetania and regions around Ilipa and Sisapo (3.2.3,

3.2.8). Some areas in what later became Lusitania were
probably opened as a result of Caesar's pacification of the
Western coast.

34

Lead is commonly found in ores along with silver and
was an important export of Spain in Republican times and
continued to be so until high quality British lead dominated
the market in the Early Empire (Pliny, N,H. 34.164). It is
generally agreed that the lead mines were privately owned
(Pliny, N,H. 34.165). At the modern Linares in the Sierra
Morena range, where interruptions in operations which Davies
relates to the activities of Sextus Pompeius in 44 B.C. are
noted, galena, lead ore, as well as silver were mined.

35

Other

centers were around Ilurco, Castona, Castulo and Ovetum, and
lead coffins have been found at Hispalis (Seville).

A

number of lead ingots have been found, many attributable
to Spain with Republican inscriptions.

36

Other metals and minerals played a role in Spain's
mining economy;· tin or

11

white lead II mines in Ovieda and

Cantabria reopened during the first century B.C.

Spanish

tin monopolized the market during the early Imperial times
as it was of a better quality than the English variety.
Copper was an important metal in the Rio Tinto district as it

10

is today.
trade.

Hispalis and Corduba served as centers for this

Numerous coins were found in this area from first

century B.c.; while the metal itself was so cheap there that
37
it was used for objects made of terracotta in other places.
Quicksilver was mined for making cinnabar (minium) and in
purifying gold; antimony, used as a remedy, was possibly also
38
mined at Lineares.
A good portion of the metals probably remained in
the provinces, paid to the governors and then redistributed
as payment for troops and other administrative costs.

39

Some of the metals were issued by the municipalities as
local coinage, both in silver and bronze during the second
40
and first centuries B.C.
The profits, though, did not aid
41
the natives as much as the Italians and Romans in Spain.
The owners of the lead mines known from the ingots mentioned
above were all Italians.

Some metal would have been removed

from the provinces as profits by Romans who did business
there, such as mine owners like Crassus, or as personal
gains by governors and their staffs.

This loss was probably

balanced by investments and immigration from Italy.
Spain was also considered a land of great agricultural
wealth in its early days (Polybius, 3.17.J; also, later,
Justinus, 44.1), but such was not actually the case.

In

the early times of Roman rule, grain had to be sent to
42
Spain.
Agriculture was limited during Republican times
to the South and East coast regions for the central highlands
were not well suited for farming.

West notes that presently

11

thirty-three per cent of the land is in grain, forty per
cent in forests and pastures, four and one half per cent in
vines and olives and feels these are approximate for the
Empire.

43

The percentages were probably not as large in

Republican times, and olive growing especially had not
become as popular as it did under the Empire (Pliny, N,H.
14.1.50, 1.5.8).
Grain production was estimated by Pliny as about
equal to Gaul (N,H. 37.803}, and Strabo points out that some
towns had to buy grain (3.1.2).

Baetica, the rich plain

between Flumen Anas and Baetis, was important as an area
of grain cultivation.
Cerialis

44

The town of Eborce was also called

and the coins of Acinipo, Ilipense and Ulia show

wheat as a symbol. Caesar mentions the grain of Citerior
(B,C. 1.48-49, 2.18), but this was probably only for local
use, and for any invading armies which happened to be involved
in a Civil War around there. Barley was grown around
Carthage Nova. By the time of the Empire, "Spain as a
whole was self-supporting, but••• the Baetis Valley alone
4.5
had a surplus to be exported."
Olive cultivation requires time and capital to
establish.

While groves are mentioned twice in the Bellum -

Hispaniense (27.1,3) they were probably not grown extensively
outside of the urbanized Baetis Valley until after Augustus
brought peace to the province. West points to the need of
urbanization and the growth of the concept of capitalistic
farming on a more profitable scale spurring on the change from

12
gr ain

to olive farming.

46

He shows that the restriction placed

on viniculture and olive growing in the Republican times
seemed to have little effect, especially in olive production.
There is doubt, though, whether this restriction was imposed
on al� the provinces or only on Gaul and whether it was
intended to aid Italian farmers and wine merchants or those
of Massilia.

47

In any case, the cultivation of olives, a

very profitable and important industry in Spain under the
Empire, began in Republican times.
Wine was an important product of Spain during the
late Republican and early Imperial times; Baetica exported
large quantities before Augustus,

48

and Pliny later

records Spanish wine as the best of the inferior wines
{N,H. 14.41, 30.71).

Viniculture was also more profitable

than grain.
Spain was noted during Caesar 1 s time for other
agricultural products which included spartum for rope,
honey of Celtiberia and figs.
profitable business.

Animals also provided a

Polybius mentioned oxen, cattle,

swine and sheep {34.8.7-10), and Caesar mentions the
purchase of Spanish horses for his Gallic campaigns (B,G.
49
7.55). The period following the fall of Numantia was a
generally peac�ful and stable time; agriculture showed
" greater diversification and a more intensive cultivation"

50

than was possible before, especially in the South and on
the Eastern coast.
The fishing industry of Spain was well known for its

13
garum, the best coming from Carthago Nova (Pliny, N,H.

31.94).

51

A more important and profitable industry was

salt fish, tunny and mackerel especially.

Coins of Gades,

Ilipa, Emporiae and certain other towns regularly used the
tunny fish as a symbol.

Spanish oysters, while known,

West feels were not exported.
Industry, trade and commerce were also growing
during the late Republic.

52

Sea trade.was extensive.

The

port of Gades, especially active, was mentioned by Caesar
(B,C. 2.18). Baetica, as already mentioned, was prosperous
in agricultural produce and minerals, and the Punic traders
had probably already laid the foundations for commerce
there before the Romans arrived.

On the East coast,

Carthago Nova had a fine port, while Tarraco terminated a
land trade route to Italy.

The river system of Spain

played an important part in the trade, both within Spain
itself and between Spain and Italy, its chief export
destination.

53

Trade appears to be in private hands until the time
54
and control may have been in the hands of
of the Severii,
Italians or Romans.

55

Spain was considered one tax unit so

intra-provincial trade would produce a higher profit, while
export-import business was subject to a two per cent (or
two and one half per cent) tariff •
. Municipal development was also advancing during the
late Republic.

The South, the area to become the province

of Baetica under Augustus, was becoming quite urbanized and

14
adopted many Roman customs.

Strabo says that they even

forgot their own language (J.2.15), an obvious exaggeration.
The hill-towns and tribal units of the central highlands
were declining. We shall look more closely at the aspects
of municipal development and

11

Romanization 11 in the last

chapter of this paper when we discuss Caesar's encouragement
of municipal advancement.

It will suffice to say that

some progress had been made and that Spain was ready for
the steps that Caesar was to take.
Polybius gives us a summary of the prices in Southern
57
The prices and the
Spain for c. 150 B.C. (34.8.7-10).
cost of living which is inferred from them was considerably
lower than that at Rome, while it is interesting to note,
slightly higher than those in the Po Valley (Polybius, 2.15).
This fact would give impetus to immigration of Italian poor
who have already been mentioned in connection with mining
and commerce.

Rostovtzeff noted that the flow of emigration

from Italy during the first century B.C. shifted from East

58

to West due to the troubles in the East.

There were enough

citizens in Ulterior during the Civil Wars for Varro's
call up of 18,000,000 HS, 20,000 pounds of silver, and
120,000 modii of grain (Caes., B,C. 2.18).
After the fall of Numantia in 133 B.C. there was
a period of general economic growth in the settled regions
of the Spanish provinces, interrupted first by the Sertorian
War.

Caesar's military expedition of 61 B.C. did not

affect the civilized parts of the provinces greatly, but the

15
Civil Wars of Caesar and later Augustus brought on hardship.
The growth after 133 was slow and uneven; Rome's policy did
not seem to attempt to foster either economic or urban
growth directly, and the Spains suffered at the hands of
poor governors and a slowness of change.· An example is the
bankruptcy revision enacted by Caesar while proconsul
(Plutarch, Caes. 12). In a period of economic growth, loans
would foster expansion, but Spain's laws and the collection
of a debt were very strict.

Add to this debts incurred

from the reparation of the Sertorian War along with the
general conservative reluctance of the governors and a debt
problem arises of the magnitude to make it worthy of mention
in Plutarch's biography., Such unwillingness to deal promptly
with the problems of the province in addition to an
unsensitive administration hindered development which might
have blossomed in the first century B.C. instead of the first
century A.D.

But such was not the case.

When Caesar enters

the picture, Spain was growing at an erratic rate economically.

16
Footnotes·for Chapter I

1. For history of early Spain see Livy, Appian and
Polybius; recent works: A. Schulten, Cambridge Ancient
History, 1930, VIII, 306-324, and Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, Real
Encyclopaedie, 1913, XVI, 2, col. 2028-46; C.H.V.
Sutherland, The Romans in Suain, 217 B,C.- A,D. 117 tLondon:
Methuen and Co., 1939).
2. For the Roman attitude on the ownership of provincial
land during the Republic, T. Frank, "'Dominium in solo
provinciali' and 'Ager publicus, 1" JRs; XVII (1927), 141-161,
and A.H.M. Jones, "In eo solo dominium populi Romani est vel
Caesaris," JRS, XXXI (1941), 26-31.
J. Sutherland, QR. cit., p. 71.

4. Appian, Iber. 45-97; for expenses of these wars, T.
Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1933), I, 222-223.
5. Sporadic trouble and wars of expansion did occur;
in c. 98 the Arevaci revolted and in 92 the Celtiberians again.
These wars did not greatly affect the settled areas of the
provinces not stir enthusiasm in Rome. For other minor wars
see Fasti Triumnhales. App., Iber. 99-100.
6. For early administration J.J. Van Nostrand, The
Reorganization of Spain J2x. Augustus (Berkeley: University of
California, 1916), pp. 90-95, and G.H. Stevenson, Cambridge
Ancient History, 1932, IX, 437-474. In 65 Gn. Calpurnius
Pisa was sent to Spain as guaestor propraetore. He seems to
be the only quaestor sent as governor.
?. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 92-93.
8. Quaestors could serve as judicial officers, as
Caesar himself did (Suet., Iul. 8).
9. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 86-87.

10. J.J.·van Nostrand, An Economic Survey of Ancient
Rome, Roman Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1937), III,
127-28.

11. Livy, 29.3.5, 4J.2.12, 30.26.6. This seems to have
been the rate set by the Carthaginians. Sources on all the
taxes of Spain for the Republican period are at times scanty,
some of them must be inferred from the policies in other
provinces, Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 126-135.

17
12. For a complete list of references, Van Nostrand,
Economic Survey, III, 128-129, also T. Frank, Economic
Survey, I, 154-156; on the question of Oscenses argenti,
G.F. Hill, Notes .Qn the Ancient Coinage of Hispania Citerior
(New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1931), pp. 135-139.
13. New portoria and vectigalia were established in
179 B.C. (Livy 40.51.8); generally, on such taxes, Van
�ostrand, Economic Survey, III, 145-147.
14. Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 146; 2½% is
supposed from the inscribed potsherds of Monte Testaccio; T.
Frank "On export tax of Spanish harbors," AJP, LVII
(1936�, 87-90, and "Notes on Roman commerce, 11 JRS, XXVII
(1937), 72-79; most potsherds are from the Empire though.
15. Ager publicus would include leases of mines. T.
Frank, " 1 Dominium in solo provinciali 1 and 'Ager publicus, 1"
JRS, XVII (1927), 145, feels the only ager publicus in
Spain during the Republic was near Carthage Nova and in the
mining regions.
16·. T. Frank, Economic Survey, I, 228-229 323-324;
also F.R. Cowell, Cicero and the Roman Republic �Baltimore:
Penguin, 1964), pp. 285-287, probably from Frank.
17. On armies, T. Frank, Economic Survey, I, 222-231,
333-336; Polybius (6.39) gives some idea of salary, which

seems to have remained the same until Caesar's time (Suet.,
Iul. 26).

18. Plut. Caes. 28, Pomn. 55; surely a political move
to counter Caesar's Gallic legions. E. Meyer sees in
Pompeius' control of these legions in absentia through
legati as a basis for supporting a precedent of the
Principate, Caesar Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus
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Chapter II

In the ten years between 69 and

59 B.C., C. Julius

Caesar, while holding all the offices to which a Roman
nobilis

was entitled (except censor and dictator), had his

first extensive contact with provincial finances on.an
administrative level.

This contact centered in Hispania

Ulterior, the province of Further Spain.

Here he served as

quaestor, here he first won the title of imperator, here he
was able to set his personal finances in order, and here
he formulated some of the policies of finance which he later
employed as dictator.

In this chapter we shall look at

some aspects of Caesar's early career, in particular his
financial policies in Spain, and attempt a comparison with
his later policies in the field of credit and debt.
Caesar held the office of quaestor in 69,

and as

such was appointed to the staff of the governor of Hispania
Ulterior, the ex-praetor Antistius Vetus, whose son later
served Caesar during the Civil Wars.

According to Suetonius

(IJJ.l. 7.1) Caesar's assignment was judicial; "cum mandatu
PR. iure dicun�o," he conducted court on an assize circuit
throughout the conventus. The language itself of the passage
indicates a reliable authority in as much as Suetonius
had access to official records.

Though little other evidence

exists concerning Caesar's quaestorship, with the exception
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of certain biographical anecdotes which are disputed,

it

is probable that he was at least introduced to the
administrative organization of provincial finances and of
the economics of Spain in particular.
Although Caesar took an active interest in his duties
and he himself supposedly said

11

• • •

initio quaesturae suae earn

provinciarn ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse
et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse 11 (Bell.
Hisp. 42), his interests lay elsewhere than in the provinces.
At thirty years of age his election to the quaestorship
.provided him a seat in the Senate under the Sullan
constitution, and it is reasonable to ,assume that his interest
would have been the furthering of his own career.

He left

his post early and on the return journey the puzzling
anecdote concerning his unsuccessful attempt to further
incite the Transpadanes who were already "de petenda civitate
4
agitantes" (Suet. Iul. 8).
Caesar I s next service in Spain came in 61, when the
province of Ulterior fell to him after his praetorship.
served there "pro consule" according to Suetonius.

He

On-his

way out of town, Caesar was accosted by his creditors
(Suet., Iul. 18; Plut., Caes. 11). It would be helpful at
this point to look at Caesar's personal financial situation
in order to gain some insight into the political and
economic motivation which might have instigated the actions
during his proconsulship in Spain, both military and
economic.

(

23
A political career had become quite costly by the

time of the late Republic and "the Roman Senator, particularly

in the early part of his career, was fre uently in debt well
6
above his wealth and disposable assets. '' Aedileships
became especially expensive, which led Cicero to comment

· on its necessity but to advise remaining within one's
resources (Off. 2.57).

The cost of elections was skyrocketing

as was the use of bribery and secret agreements which can be

seen in the frequent accusations of ambitus. The involved
situation of the consular election of 54 B.C. is a good

example, while for the cost of the votes, Caesar's own

words to his mother concerning his pontifical election, " •••dum
se nisi pontificem non reversurum" (Suet., Iul. 13), provide
some idea.

Indeed, his opponent Catulus tried to remove

Caesar from the running by offering to pay some of his debts
(Plut., Caes. 7.2). The money lenders themselves were not

unwilling to make a profit from elections as can be seen

in the sudden rise bf the interest rate from four to eight

per cent in 54 (Cic.,Att. 4.15.7; Quint. 2.14.4).

In as much as eligibility for office required at

least Equestrian status along with a wealth in disposable
resources of 400,000 HS, and by law (though probably not
generally enforced until after 49 B.C.) the hoarding of

coin was restricted, much of a man's wealth would necessarily
be tied up in land with which he would be unwilling to part

as it was an indication of his financial position.

The sale

of a large portion of a Senator's property could reflect on
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his credit standing, his fides.
Caesar to remark:

11 • • •

This hold on land prompted

integras vero tenere possessiones,

qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae
est? 11 (B,C. 3.20). As a result a politician would often
borrow when in need of cash rather than liquidate his
own resources.
"To remain a senator not only in legal terminology
your existimatio, but also your fides must remain intact."

8

Failure to meet financial obligations was a cruel fortune
under Roman law. The treatment of debtors was harsh.
Proscriptio and venditio bonorum could result, and a man
might even be banned from public places (infarnia) or removed
from the Senate by the censors.

This would quite literally

ruin a politician's career for life.

However, the process

of temporary bondage (addictio) to the creditor was
probably not enforced in the late Republic.
Unless one had a considerable family fortune at his
disposal the obvious and only solution was to borrow.
this road ran in two directions.

But

The loan was in actuality

an investment in the future of the rising politician often
with no tangible security or collateral.

A good deal of

the money was spent on intangibles such as games or ambitus.
For a creditor whose only interest was the recovery of
his capital, the calling up of such a debt would not readily
be an advantage.

The money had been spent.

Caesar

recognized the duality of the creditor-debtor relationship
when he borrowed from his officers to pay his soldiers

2.5
(Caes., B,C. 1.39).

Frederiksen believes this was the reason
9
for Caesar's loan from Cicero in 47 or 46.
The complexities of personal finances can be seen
in Cicero's loan mentioned above. After repeated attempts
to_collect, Caesar's secretary Faberius offered to pay off
the debt with the notes of others, a process called delegatio
debitoris (Cic., Att. 12.3.2).
"The greater the wealth that could be concentrated in
the hands of individuals, the more the struggle for political
10
power was transformed into a problem of finance."
It was
of great importance for the rising politician to be an
expert at manipulating funds, usually someone else's, and
Caesar was an expert.

Though his family was not one of

the wealthiest, Caesar managed to raise the funds for an
extravagant early career.

Plutarch reports that he was

already thirteen hundred talents in debt before he held any
public office (Caes • .5.4) and surely his quaestorship
would not have provided all the sums he would need.

As

curator of the Appian Way in 67 B.c., he spent personal funds
for some of the work. As aedile, he furnished public
works and exhibitions and a gladitorial show in honor of
his father which threatened to be so extravagant that the
Senate limite4 the number of pairs of combatants.

His

election as pontifex maximus and praetor must have been
very costly, but it was not political costs alone that
increased Caesar's debts.

He was well known for his

extravagance, such as the villa on Lake Nemi, which when
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found distasteful he had torn down and rebuilt, or Servillia 1 s
pearl.

It is not surprising that his debts amounted to

11
twenty-five million denarii as Appian states (B,C. 2.26).
Caesar was a good manipulator, even if one believes
only a part of his financial involvements while he was
consul and later Gallic proconsul, absent from Rome. He·
made a good profit from the Egyptian affair, dividing
six thousand talents from Ptolemy Auletes (the Flute-player)
with Pompeius, a scheme that Crassus had attempted a few
years earlier but failed (Suet. Iul. 54).

His intrigues

in the scandalous election of 54 B.C. and his

11

buying 11 of

many Senators with Gallic money were well known, and mention
has already been made of his use of the creditor-debtor
relationship.

From his management of his personal funds

we can see that Caesar had a good grasp of the intricacies
of financial manipulation along with the problems of debt
and that at the time of his leaving for Spain he was very
much in debt and on bad terms with his creditors (Suet.,Iul.
18; Plut.,Caes. 11).
Who these creditors were we are not told, but
whoever they were, their action at this precise time seems
strange.

We may well understand their seeing the period

between Caesar!s immunity as praetor and his actual accession
to the proconsulship as their only chance for legal steps
to recover their money, but their action came just before
Caesar had an opportunity to improve his personal fortune
(or rather the lack thereof) for the first time.

It is very
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unlikely that, had Caesar been unable to persuade Crassus or
some other wealthy individual to cover his debts until he
returned from Spain, these creditors would have been able
to recover their investments.·

The money had already been

spent mostly on intangibles - games, elections and public
works.
Two explanations may be proposed for this inopportune
recall of loans.

It might well have been politically

instigated by Caesar's enemies to delay his departure from
Rome.

That Caesar was in a hurry to depart for Spain is

related by Suetonius (Iul. 18) and Michael Grant rightly
suggests that he felt uncomfortable with the victorious
Pompeius returning in part due to his supposed intrigue
12
Caesar's enemies realized that
with Pompeius' wife, Mucia.
a delay in his departure would afford them a delightful
opportunity to create animosity between Pompeius and Caesar.
While this supposition on political grounds may be
likely we are given no support for it from our sources.

It

is more likely that this was merely a manifestation of the
need for money among the money lenders.

With the advent

of Pompeius, new opportunities for investment in the new
Asian provinces would open.

During Cicero's consulship

it was necessary to restrict the outflow of gold and silver
from Italy.

13

Allen

14

has proposed that this money was to

be used in provincial investments.

If Caesar's creditors were

money lenders of the Ordo Eguestris, which seems likely,
they would have been in need of ready cash for investment in
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Asia.

They might well have assumed that wealthy Crassus, to

whom Caesar had been allied in the past and who wished to
oppose the returning Pompeius, would be willing to cover some
of his debts now, which he did with eight hundred and thirty
talents (Plut., Caes. 11). They would be willing to forgo
the additional year's interest in favor of the possibly
larger gains to be made, so Caesar merely exchanged one
group of creditors for another, Crassus, who might be
expected to support his ally more willingly.
Caesar's haste to leave for his province has already
been mentioned, and indeed, he did leave before the
allotment of and budget for the province had been formally
ratified by the Senate (Suet.,Iul. 18). Suetonius gives two
reasons - to avoid lawsuits, possibly more actions by
creditors, or " ••• quo maturius sociis inplorantibus
subveniret"; calling to mind his later haste to reach Genava
in 58 B.c. (Caes., B,G. 1.7).

As soon as Caesar arrived

in Spain he raised an additional ten cohorts to augment the
forces already there (Plut., Caes. 12) and Caesar might well
have used the "socii inplorantes" and his necessity for
early departure to request additional funds in the budget to
support this new legion.

However, these cohorts could surely

have been paid.from the booty, and Caesar would have had
some idea of the extent of the profits to be gained and expenses
and necessities before beginning his campaign. We are not
given any information that the allotment for Spain was
increased at this time.
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Caesar's term as proconsul in Ulterior was characterized
by two aspects.

The first was his military exploitation

for personal financial rewards and augmentation of his
political career by conquest.

The other was his administrative

reforms of the Spanish economic situation. According to T.
Frank, "Julius Caesar provided the ugl�est example in
Roman history of provincial looting for personal gain."

15

We

might partially excuse Caesar's ruthless conquests on the
basis of bringing peace to a region which was being ravaged
by the most savage and incorrigible brigands, but such does
not seem to be the case.

Dio (J7.52.l-2) explicitly states

that the situation was not as grave as Caesar's actions were
brutal and excessive.

Suetonius (Iul. 54) tells us that he

plundered a certain Lusitanian town after it had surrendered.
While the brigandage along the northern borders of Hispania
Ulterior had been a constant and expensive burden, there is
no evidence, neither primary nor secondary other than
Suetonius' brief statement (Iul. 18), that would indicate
it was any worse at this particular time, nor that it
threatened the province to such an extent that Caesar had to
rush to his command and raise an additional ten cohorts,
bringing the strength of the contingent to about three legions.
As expl�nation, not excuse, we may look to the system
itself, which produced governors who acted as Caesar did.
The career of a Roman politician was expensive and often
as not he was considerably indebted by the time of a
provincial appointment.

Since government service paid no

JO
salary, a magistrate looked to his provincial term to provide
some capital to help cover the expenses incurred in gaining
the office.

In this light, the Senate would sometimes vote

a surplus in the last provincial appointment for a magistrate,
as_was probably the case in the unusually high four and
one half million denarii Macedonian budget for L. Piso in
16
58.
Caesar was personally indebted and the province
provided a long-awaited means of alleviating some of that
burden while also increasing his political reputation by
the title of imperator. Our sources are in agreement that
his military operations made him wealthy and provided some
booty to the treasury (App., B,C. 2.8).
When Caesar had concluded his conquests, having
enriched himself that he might return to Home " •••cuius nunc
venti valde sunt secundi" (Cic., Att. 2.1.6) and been
proclaimed imperator, he turned to affairs of administration
as proconsul and patron of the province.

We see here a policy

similar to the one he followed later in Gaul, fighting during
the season and civil administration during the off season.
Appian (B,C. 2.8) specifically states that Caesar
neglected public and judicial administration.

This

statement follows in context his account of Caesar's conquests
and precedes Caesar's return to Home to stand for consul,
so it cannot be taken in the supposition that Caesar at
first neglected administrative duties in favor of conquest
and must stand as an overall statement concerning Appian's
view of the proconsulship. Contemporary sources tell us
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that Caesar was active as a benefactor in civil and judicial
administration.

Cicero mentions this in his speech Pro

Balbo 43; Caesar himself in the De Bello Civili 2.18,20;
and mention is also made in the De Bello Hispaniensi 42.
Plutarch (Caes. 12) is a specific source for a debt settlement
in Spain.

It appears that Appian either overlooked Caesar's

17

civil measures through lack of proper preparation

and

proper source material, or that he is attempting to shade
Caesar's character as a civil administrator in favor of his
military prowess.

For such a purpose, a simple omission

would not have been sufficient.
Our sources mention two main actions by Caesar
concerning the economic status of the province:
l.' Caesar sought to lessen the burden of taxation
imposed since the Sertorian War: "insequente praetura
ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus inposuisset
a senatu petisse et ea pecunia provinciam liberasse ••• "
(Bell. Hisp. 42).
'
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During the campaign against Sertorius, Q. Caeclius
Metellus Pius served as governor of Ulterior.

Following

the murder of Sertorius in 72 and the final operations of
the war in 71 a settlement was made by Pompeius.

In Citerior

PQmpeius seems to have acted justly and gained many clientes.
As a result, Citerior is an especially active Pompeian
stronghold during the Civil Wars for Pompeius and later for
his sons, a fact of which Caesar took note later (B,C. 2.18).
Grants of citizenship, affirmed by Lex Gellia Cornelia,
18
even extended into Ulterior.
Metellus must have imposed
certain taxes to cover some of the cost of the war, either
during or in the final settlement, and these taxes were still
in effect when Caesar arrived as the statement in the De
19
Bello Hispaniensi indicates.
The term vectigalia generally is used to include taxes
other than tributum, which for Spain had been a half a tithe
since Carthaginian times (Livy 43.2.12) and had been increased
in the past to pay war costs, as in 203 B.C. "Stipendium eius

anni duplex et frumentum sex mensum imperatum ••• " (Livy 29.J.5).
Vectigalia included the various other taxes, such as
revenues from the mines and public land, customs duties
(two or two and one-half per cent), inheritance taxes (five
per cent), manumission of slaves (five per cent), sale of
slaves (four per cent).

The reason that Metellus increased

vectigalia as opposed to tributum is not given, nor which
particular vectigalia were increased.

That the author (Bell.

Hisp. 42) was unaware of the distinction between the two
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terms, and thus used vectigalia in a general sense is unlikely,
especially as the words are said to have come directly from
Caesar's mouth.
Ulterior was a prosperous and well urbanized section
o�_Spain, particularly around the old Punic centers in the
South.

The cities of the South such as Gades, Hispalis and

Corduba had grown prosperous.
Sierra Morena were prospering.

Mines of the Rio Tinto and
In agriculture olives were

beginning to be profitable, large quantities of wine were
being exported (Strabo 3.2.6} and much grain was being raised.
Shipping and commerce were profitable, especially around
Gades.

An increase in vectigalia would be effective in

this prosperous section for deriving money from cities,
mines and produce which would not be covered by tributum.
By way of precedent, Lucullus, attempting to ease the burden
of debt which Sulla left Asia had shifted from land taxes to
21
those which could be collected in cities of little land.
This supposes an ingenuity which Metellus did not seem to
have possessed, but there is little other information with
which to work.
It has been generally assumed that the debts referred
to by Plutarch (Caes. 12} were also a result of the
22
and it is likely that
settlement of the Sertorian War,
some of the debts were outstanding from the imposition of
new or the increase of already existing vectigalia by
Metellus and mentioned above.

Sutherland accounts for the

debts, and rightly I believe, on the basis of economic

34
advancement and increase in exports.

23

The previous fifty

years of the Republic had seen economic advances, especially
in southern Spain, and such advances were likely to bring
on loans for expansion.
The debt measure instituted by Caesar was not a
cancellation, as Plutarch clearly states, but rather provided
for the settlement of the debts, still to be paid in full,
and eased the burden of the debtor.

As to the interest on

the debt, usually about twelve per cent, nothing is said.
The creditors were most probably natives, either Spaniards
or Italian businessmen in Spain, for loans from Rome had
been restricted both by the Lex Gabinia de Usura, which
in effect prohibited loans to provincials from Rome, and
by the later restrictions, passed during Cicero's consulship,
25
which forbade the export of gold or silver.
In the same
I
8t<T1tOT"IJl'

indicates that the debtors were
26
probably individual land owners rather than cities.
The
light, the word

effect Caesar's action had was to establish a less severe
method of repayment of debts by natives while keeping the
debtor a productive member of his community.
This debt settlement has been compared to that which
27
Lucullus attempted in Asia.
In this settlement, though,
the cities themselves were indebted and the creditors
28
were, in some cases, publicani.
Caesar's settlement
granted a more favorable percentage (two-thirds) to the
creditors than did Lucullus 1 one-fourth.

The gratitude

of the Ordo Eguestris surely should not be overlooked as a

35
political motive.
Both of the measures which Caesar undertook in Spain
should have had the effect of easing circulation and credit
within the province.

The money from the vectigalia remaining

in-the province would offset booty taken by Caesar (mostly
from the less civilized North) and spur local investment,
while a more reasonable solution to the debt question
would make credit easier.

While the creditor did receive

less per year, the solvency of the debtor would ensure
eventual payment in full without the necessity of foreclosure
and auction of property.

The continued ownership of the

land by the debtor hindered the growth of latifundia, and
created a better state of well being for the peasant
29
population.
In Caesar's economic measures in Spain during his
praetorship some writers have found a precedent for his
later measures in handling the financial crisis created by
the Civil War.

JO

The general's armed invasion of Italy

brought on an immediate financial crisis, but the war itself
was not as much an economic struggle as a political power
struggle.
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The initial impact, as in any time of crisis, was

a general feeling of financial insecurity, heightened in
the minds of the propertied class by the fears of complete
remission of debts, novae tabulae, and agrarian reform
through land confiscation.

Coin would be the safest form

for one's wealth at such a time; as a result debts would be
called up.

To add to the strain on the currency in

36
circulation, the armies had to be pai� to insure their
loyalty.

Caesar himself borrows from his officers to pay

his troops (B.C. 1.39) and mints large quantities of new
coin, reinstituting the sestertius and guinarius and creating
a -new issue of aurei.

32

The need for money was great

enough to risk the sanctity of the tribune by taking money
from the Temple of Saturn, money reserved for protection
against a Gallic invasion.

33

Pompeians also were in need of

Varro calls up 18,000,000 HS and 2� 000
pounds of silver from citizens in Hispania Ulterior.
The
coin for troops.

4

voracity of the creditors and generals for coin created a
shortage where one had not existed before th� crisis.
called it caritas nummorum (Att. 9.94).

Cicero

In turn, money

became harder to borrow and property values dropped.
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Caesar shows some degree of insight in control of
currency and credit in his attempt to handle this situation.
The times were turbulent and his own position was not
stable, even after Munda; he spent only a little more than
a year in Rome between his invasion and his assassination.
In such an atmosphere financial stability was naturally
lacking.

Whether his measures would have cured the ills,

or what other measures he would have introduced, we shall
never know.
Caesar's measures were·aimed at freeing the flow of
wealth and re-establishing credit by stabilizing property
values and providing for the proper repayment of debts.

Our

sources differ in some aspects of the actual details, and the

37
dating of various measures is in dispute, but let us follow
some of the main points.

36

The first step had already been taken when Caesar
arrived -. the lowering of the legal interest rate by the
tribunes (Dio, 41.J?).

37

Caesar provided for the transfer

'�,, t X ·✓ � · ) as payment of debts and ,established
.,

•A- .,_

I

..,.,a.,:;ors · to fix the value (aestimatio) of

property at either the time of the loan (Dio, 42.51) or
1 1 ante

civile bellum 11 (Suet. Iul. 42). Trebonius, as

praetor urbanus, was in charge of these aestimationes
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when the renewed call for novae tabulae arose from .Caelius,
a former Catilinarian.

The interest on these loans was

dealt with probably in 47; either being deducted from the
capital or cancelled since the war began (Dio, 42.51).
Either case resulted in a net loss of about twenty-five
per cent to creditors, but this was a loss only of interest,
40
not capital.
Other measures were to spur the circulation of
currency by limiting hoarding.

For this Caesar reinstituted

an old law which forbade the hoarding of more than 15,000
denarii.

41

How effective this measure was we are not told.
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Later, in 47 according to Dio (42.51),

he released everyone

from rent, up to 500 denarii, for one year - a measure
which would aid the lower classes, the insula dweller in
.
43,
Rome and the tenant farmer in Italy.
Caesar also
reinstituted the uortoria on foreign goods (Suet, Iul. 43)
and reduced the number on the corn dole.

The new coin issues,

J8
already mentioned, though probably issued for military
pay and equipment, would have found their way into circulation.
44
Frederiksen
presents a good case from Tacitus
(Ann. 6.16-17) for including in these measures a lex Iulia
de_bonis cedendis, which provided a more lenient settlement
of bankruptcy.

Under such a measure the debtor would admit

insolvency before the praetor and retain some portion of
his estate while the remainder would be given over to the
creditor{s) through a cessio bonorum.
Such were Caesar's measures during his dictatorship.
That they probably had not affected a miraculous cure
be seen in Cicero (Marc. 23, Fam. 11.28.2).

45

can

The confiscation

of Pompeians' property as the Civil War dragged on kept
property values low.
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The political situation during the

last six years of Caesar's life was never stable enough to
be conducive to a stable economy.
Both the measures in Spain during Caesar's proconsulship
and those enacted during his dictatorship in Rome dealt to
a large extent with the problems of debt and the debtor
creditor relationship.

In both situations Caesar followed

the middle road between complete remission of debt
complete enforcement of already existing laws.

47

and

The

similarity in easing the burden on the debtor is especially
strong if we accept Frederiksen's lex Iulia.
The situations which produced the problems, on the
other hand, were quite different in scope and instigation.
The measures in Spain were to counter problems which had
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existed for a number of years and to free money for economic
growth in a single province.

Rome, on the other hand,

was the financial center of the Mediterranean world by
this time.

Such measures, brought on by the political

situation and its related currency and credit crisis, would
have an effect elsewhere in the Roman World.
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Chapter III

The Spanish provinces were not directly affected
by Caesar personally during the period from 61 until the
•Civil Wars.

They did play a part during the fifties as a

basis on which opposition to Caesar might build a balance
of power.

During his consulship Caesar did affect extensive

legal revision of provincial administration which in part
required governors to settle their financial accounts in
the province before leaving.

The lex Iulia repetundarum did

not seem to affect any miraculous change in attitude toward
the provinces though it made the administration more expedient
and provided grounds for actions against governors by
provincials.
In

55

B.C. Pompeius was given the governorship of

both the Spanish provinces (Cic., Att. 4.9.1), but he
remained in Home, presumably under the legal pretext of
the curatio annonae which he had held since

57.

In

52

he

had his command extended for an additional five years
(Plut., Pomp. 55.12, Caes. 28.8; Dio 40.44.2). The number
of legions approximately doubled and a budget of six million
denarii was provided.

The opposition to Caesar surely saw

this as a balance to Caesar's armies, especially after the
death of Crassus and Pompeius seemed to be drawing more
toward the senatorial point of view (Caes., B,C. 1.84).
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While Pompeius remained in Rome, Spain was administered
by legati; by 49 the two provinces had been divided into three
administrative units: Citerior, Ulterior (to the Anas) and
the remaining part of Ulterior including Lusitania (Caes.,
B.�. 1.38), with a total of seven legions in all Spain.
This tripartite division of the Spanish peninsula by Pompeius
can easily be seen as a precedent for Augustus' later
division of Spain into three provinces.

The southern part

of Ulterior, particularly the Baetis Valley region, had grown
very prosperous, while the central and western sections,
where mineral and agricultural potential had not yet been
fully utilized, had remained less urbanized since Caesar's
proconsulship.

In addition, the northern border was not

completely peaceful until Augustus' conquests as can be seen
in the military nature of the colonies Caesar founded there.

5

When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, Spain was in Pompeian
hands under the legati, L. Afranius, M. Petreius, and the
prolific author, M. Terrentius Varro.

Spain was mustered to

war (Caes., B,C. 1.38-39, 2.18). Pompeius had been a
benefactor to the Spanish people from the time of the
Sertorian War and his clientelae were numerous there (Caes.,
B,C. 1.61, 2.18).

Caesar also had some political friendships

in the peninsula, particularly in Ulterior.
remained loyal to him,

Some towns

but the armies and the wealth of

the province were under control of his opposition.
"Economic motives are usually traced with ease in
the case of civil wars, but not in this one."

7

The struggle
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was a political and military one, centered around personal
ambition and carried on through professional armies.
Constitutional questions and political theory became material
of propaganda; sides were taken on the basis of vested
interest and personal alliances.

Italy itself was not

enthusiastic and neither side was able to call up large
enlistments of troops for their cause.

8

Much of the action

was in the provinces, and there the burden of the armies was
felt most heavily.
Caesar quickly took Italy, Pompeius having fled from
Brundisium.

Caesar could not follow - no ships (Caes., B,C.

1.29); he decided to turn his attention to Spain,
reason for this tactical movement was manysided.

The
The lack

of ships, the danger of leaving Italy with an unfriendly army
in Spain, the Pompeian control of.grain supply, all seem to
have played some part in his decision.
might also have been a concern.

The mines in Spain

Caesar was in need of money

for his troops (Caes., B,C. 1.39) and Italy itself was in
financial crisis due to the shortage of coin.

Control of

Spain's metal wealth would not be essential in a short term
war, but if the war were protracted, the necessity of coin
to insure the loyalty of troops and stabilize the nhome10
front" might W$11 be as important as the grain supply.
Though no mention of the importance of Spain as a source of
financial wealth is made, we do find that Caesar does not
abstain from taking money after his initial victory there
(Dio 42.24) and later in 46 B.C. he symbolized Spain as
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the land of silver (Vell. Pater. 2.56.2).

This was surely

not the most important reason for Caesar's Spanish campaigns,
but it might well have played a part in his decision.
Spain suffered during the Civil Wars with almost
co�tant troubles.

The initial actions did not bring wide

spread hardship but the support of the huge armies and their
later settlement in the province was not beneficial.
designee for governor was very poorly chosen.

Caesar's

Q. Cassius

Longinus began a systematic plundering of the provinces in
11
general with himself as benefactor
which led to unrest and
rebellion.

Pompeian forces again gained some control over

Spain which was not relaxed even after Munda, for Sextus
Pompeius carried on his war after Caesar's death.
Such an unstable political situation was not conducive
to a stable economy for the province either as a selfentity of as a part of the Roman world.
affected the agricultural production.

Military operations

Grain was needed to

feed the armies, taken from lands that probably did not
produce a great surplus (Caes., B,C. 1.48,49), while the
unstable political situation would discourage long-term
investments such as olive growing.

Mining and industry

were affected, as we have already noted in the case of the
mines at Linar�s.

Commerce was also hampered, on land

by the armies and at sea since ships were commandeered
for movement of troops (Caes., B,C. 2.18,19).

Some

individuals surely prospered by supplying the armies, but
the general unstable political situation and the uncertain
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future would make long-term planning difficult.

Poor

administration made the situation even less favorable.
Though this situation was less than beneficial, it
was unavoidable in the power struggle which existed at
that time.

The political and personal conflict affected

the provinces as well as the city itself, but·caesar had
some concept of the need for stability and organization in
Spain for the time when his civil conflicts were ended.

This

fact is evident in his steps toward municipal reorganization.
"It was in the extension of the colonial system that his
12
finest achievement lay."
Certain sections of Spain had been urbanized
during the first century B.C.

Economic opportunities,

money and manpower immigrating from Italy spurred the
growth of municipal centers.

The growth of the mining

industry and the diversification in agriculture have been
noted in the first chapter of this paper.

This growth was

especially evident in the South (Strabo 3.2.15) and the
east coast where centralization in towns which had a Punic
or Greek heritage arose from the need of commerce and wealth.

13

In the central highlands and the western coast changes were
also occurring.

"The old tribal units were breaking down,

and many village communities exercised the sovereign
rights of a Greek polis."

14

The old native gentes, surrounding

a fortified castellum, were developing into towns, some into
the status of oppida stipendiaria. Only eight towns reached
the status of municipium before Caesar's time in Citerior.
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In both provinces the adaptation of Roman municipal
systems was lacking.

Formal Roman colonization was meager

in Spain before Caesar.

The first was Tarraco, noted by

Pliny as Scipionum opus (N.H. 3.21) and later Graccuris
and Valentia.
Following Caesar's victory at Ilerda and his over
throw of the Pompeian commanders in both provinces, he looked
to the disbanding of the Pompeian armies and the insuring
of a friendly province at his back when he proceeded east
again.

1.5

Then, following the operations of 46 B.c., he again

made grants of favor to his allies (Dio 43.39 • .5).

Some

towns were granted colonial status directly, such as Ucubi
in Ulterior (Bell. Hisp. 27) while others such as Hispalis,
presumably pro-Pompeian, were resettled by Caesar's troops
(Bell. Hisp. 3.5).

The charter of one of these resettled

·colonies, Colonia Genetiva Iulia, at Urso (modern Osuna)
16
has been preserved.
In the regard to the extent of colonization and
municipal grants, Caesar tended to favor Ulterior more than
Citerior.

Henderson numbers the Latin charters granted by

Caesar in Ulterior as thirty-four and colonies as six, while
in Citerior only three and three respectively.

17

Citerior

had been more closely linked with Pompeius in the past (Caes.,
B.C. 1.61, 2.18) by his magnis beneficiis, and Ulterior with
Caesar (Bell. Hisp. 42; Caes. B.C. 2.21).

Grants as a reward

and encouragement for loyalty would naturally make this
disproportionate balance.

Sutherland proposes that Caesar was

50
attempting to unite the urbanized Baetis Valley with less
18
settled north and west coast regions.
With military
colonies in the North and civil colonies in the pacified
regions, Ulterior would be easier to administer as a unit.
"The true importance of Caesar is that he first
exported Latium and the colonial system in bulk to transmarine
19
From Dio (43.39.5) we find three types of
provinces••• "
grants:
1.

I

_;t w f'L._

' ,

''\ 1-(JL clTt.A£.Lr¥..land confiscated from

Pompeians, as the colony at Hispalis, along with
tax exemption.
I

2. 7t OAlTCLol

- to individual and possibly also

municipia such as Emporiae.
,
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This statement in conjunction with the number of Latina
21
oppida found in Pliny (N,H. 3.7, 4.117)
and the statements
of Strabo on Baetica and Gallia Narbonensis (3.2.15, 4.1.12)
leads to the conclusion that Caesar extended the ius Latii in
22

Spain.

"The extension of Roman citizenship within the

provinces is limited to areas where there is a solid
foundation of Italian immigration, and that communities
where the native element preponderated were favoured with
23
a grant of Latin rights rather than the citizenship."
The granting of Latin rights to already urbanized
settlements and the increase in the number of municipalities
would augment the uniformity of administration, making the

.51
province as a whole easier to administer from Rome, while
granting more local autonomy to the municipalities.

Tax

exempt status would free funds to be us�d in local growth,
and the increase in local autonomy would free the municipal
population from arbitrary or unresponsive policies at Rome.
The widespread grants of the franchise would lessen the
importance of its holder going to Rome, thus allowing
the province to retain its most able politicians.
The founding of new colonies, while immediately
necessary as a reward to loyal troops, provided the province
with new markets for goods, protection along the borders,
and pacification and civilization in more unsettled areas.
Their municipal governments, working under the duoviri
system, would have provided an ideal for other communities
to work toward.

The charter of Urso provides some idea of

the character of the administration in the municipal
government probably along lines very similar to those of
Italy.
Were Caesar's actions taken in merely a "desire to
obtain men, money and good-will in return for favors granted,
24
or by a genuine interest in the welfare••• " of the province?
Both motives would seem to be at work.

The necessities of the

political situ�tion dictated some of Caesar's actions.

Troops

and loyalty had to be rewarded; goodwill had to be insured.
But the extent and organization of his grants indicated more.
Sites for colonies showed that the interest in commerce
or industry may have been noted.

Tarraco, containing
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a colony founded by Caesar, was a main commercial center
on the land route to Italy and later became the capital
of Citerior; Hispalis was situated on the farthest point
of the Baetis River accessible to large ships.

25

The actions

Ca�sar took were beneficial to all concerned.
Whether Caesar's policy in the extension of Latin
rights and the founding of colonies greatly improved
the general economic growth of Spain is unclear.

We cannot

even be sure that Caesar's plans were complete when he died.
Augustus• extensive reorganization of Spain overlay much
of the work of Caesar, and source material for the intervening
period is limited, but the fact that it was done indicates
that Caesar's work was not extensive enough.
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16. Dessau, Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae, 6087; see
N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, .QQ. cit., pp. 420-428.
17. M.I. Henderson, QQ.. cit., pp. 11-12.
18. C.H.V. Sutherland, .Qn. cit., pp. 121-126.
19. A.N. Sherwin-White, .Qn. cit., p. 178.
20. The first widespread enfranchisement of Spaniards
occurred in 89 when a group of auxiliaries was rewarded for
bravery before Ausculum.
21. Thirty-eight; Agrippa's survey is generally
taken as source for Pliny.
22. A.N. Sherwin-White, .Qn. cit., pp. 176-179; M. I.
Henderson, .Qn. ill., p. 10 n. 57.
23. A.N. Sherwin-White, .Qn. cit., p. 170; Henderson
shows that the new citizens were enrolled in tribus Galeria;
,2£. cit., p. 10 n. 57.

24. Van·Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 103-4.
25. G.F. Hill, .Qn. cit. section on Tarraco; T.
FranJ(. Economic History, pp. 3 8-349 also mentions the
commercial importance of Caesar's colonies at Corinth
and Carthage.
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.5.5
Conclusion

The question we set out to investigate was whether
Caesar exhibited an organized policy toward the economy of
the Spanish provinces.

Two distinct aspects have been

considered: that of Spain itself and its economic growth and
that of Caesar personally and his policies.
During the first century B.C. the Spanish peninsula
was exhibiting signs of the economic growth which reached its
height during the first two centuries of Imperial times.
Mining, industry and commerce were flourishing.
was becoming more diverse and profitable.

Agriculture

Italian immigration,

both of money and manpower, was providing an impetus to
spur the growth which had been slowed in part due to the
inconsistent and, at times, exploitative administration
which the Republican Roman governors provided.
As an aspiring young politician and general, Caesar
found in Spain an opportunity to enhance his personal
position.

He, as proconsul following his praetorship,

strengthened his dignitas and recouped his personal finances
there.

We have seen that he was adept at personal financial

maneuvers, that he was greatly in debt, and that he did
indeed exploit the situation in Spain to his own financial
gain.

Badian calls him "the greatest brigand of them all,"

and it would seem rightly so.

1
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On the other hand, Caesar was no Verres.

He did

exhibit a degree of concern for the provincials during his
proconsulship and an understanding of both the economic
situation and the consequences which his own authority
could bring to bear.

His debt settlement, though not

innovative, was sound and beneficial to the province as a
whole.

2

The recension of the vectigalia freed money in the

province.

Caesar was a politician and we must not overlook

the fact that these actions, while helpful to the province,
were also extremely helpful to him personally.

He became

a patron of towns and individuals which surely aided him
in his later career.

What was good for Caesar turned out

to be good for the province also.
Did Caesar use his governorship to formulate principles
of or a system for later economic measures?
unlikely.

This seems

Surely his governorship in Spain proved educational

in respect to handling a debt problem, but so far as we have
investigated,the situation in Spain and that in Rome during
his dictatorships were different.

In both instances Caesar

reacted to the situation and his measures were dictated
by the situation.

The only parallel between the two would

be in an easing of the process of a creditor taking property
of the debtor, if we accept Frederiksen 1 s lex Iulia de
bonis cedendis.
When Caesar returned to Spain it was as one of the
contestants in a political power struggle that was to
change the Roman world.

It was not likely that he was
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unmindful of his position or·or the future.

The steps

that he took in extending municipal government seem to be
a definite attempt to provide some uniformity of administration.
Such a more expedient administration would surely have
made the economic life more healthy.

However, this does

not seem to be Caesar's main consideration.

While it is

true that colonies were placed at times in consideration
of their commercial potential, the main concern was the
rewarding of loyal veterans.

His municipal grants were

merely a raising of the status of towns or areas which were
already urbanized and ready for such action.

I suppose that

the question of Caesar's economic policy towards Spain
might best be summed up in the words of T. Frank, "Julius
Caesar's program was apparently not thought out in economic
terms, and yet Caesar more than any other Roman statesman
seems to have considered the economic aspects of his
3
political measures."
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Footnotes for Conclusion

1. E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic,p.78,
2. There is no inference from our sources that it
applied only to the Roman citizen in Spain.

3. T. Frank, Economic History, p. 347.
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